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Introduction 
The United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, also known as the 
"Hyde Act,” is the legal framework for a bilateral pact between the United States and India under 
which the United States will provide access to civilian nuclear technology and access to nuclear 
fuel in exchange for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on civilian Indian reactors. 
This deal has been most controversial and debated for the past two years.  
There are five major differences between the United States and India related to some clauses of 
Hyde Act:  
1. The Return Clause  
2. Reprocessing of Spent Fuel  
3. Nuclear Testing  
4. Lifetime Fuel Guarantee  
5. Fallback Safeguards  
For resolving these differences, India has to conclude a bilateral 123 agreement with the United 
States, engage the IAEA, and seek changes to the rules of the forty five member NSG. Other 
objections and obstacles to the deal from the Indian side are as follows:  
• India is going to compromise with national security interests pertaining to its nuclear 
deterrent.  
• It will likely lead to energy insecurity in India in the case that the United States withdraws 
its support or does not supply the technology and sufficient material in time.  
• Disagreement of coalition Left parties with the deal on the grounds that it is against 
communist China.  
It is clear, by now, that the main obstacle to the signing of the nuke deal comes from the left 
parties. Their green signal can make it possible to the Manmohan Singh Government to ride the 
Civil Nuclear Deal with the United States. But it seems almost impossible observing the recent 
outcome of the talks between the UPA government and the left parties.  
The United States sees this Civil-Nuclear deal with India as the fulfillment of a longstanding drive 
to bring India under the global non-proliferation regime, though indirectly.  
As R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, told the Asia Society in New 
York on 18 October 2005, “India has agreed for the first time in thirty years to take on key global 
non-proliferation commitments... Without this agreement, India, with its large and sophisticated 
nuclear estates, would continue to remain unregulated by international rules governing commerce 
in sensitive nuclear technologies.”  
The agreement also transforms what had been one of the most divisive issues in Indo-U.S. 
relations for the past thirty years into a new opportunity for cooperation. “This will bring India into 
the international nonproliferation mainstream and open new doorways for a cleaner and more 
secure global energy future,” Burns said. “It also will allow India to develop much more quickly its 
own civilian nuclear power industry, reducing demands on the world energy market... U.S.-Indian 
cooperation on nuclear energy will therefore strengthen the international order in a way that 
advances the interests of both the nuclear and the non-nuclear signatories of the Non 
Proliferation Treaty.”[1]  
The 1990s convinced many reasonable people that India would never formally and unilaterally 
cap its nuclear arsenal. The United States learned that denuclearizing India was an unachievable 
objective: India insisted that its own disarmament would require global elimination of nuclear 
weapons, and its unwavering position left little reason to doubt that.  
After India conducted a series of nuclear tests in 1998, the United States began a fundamental 
reexamination of its policy. Yet there were other options that might have been more carefully 
explored. Might India have agreed to set a future limit on its stockpile of nuclear materials? Might 
it have agreed to subject all future power reactors to inspections? Might it have passed legislation 
deepening its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests? The U.S. administration did not ignore 
these possibilities, but it ultimately made clear to New Delhi that it was willing to open nuclear 
cooperation even if India refused additional restrictions. That decision reflected a certain realism 
about the political situation in India, as many on the Indian right oppose any restrictions on the 
Indian nuclear program.  
The Bush administration made a strategic judgment: a stronger U.S.-Indian relationship would 
greatly improve America’s position in Asia and the world, but American barriers to nuclear 
cooperation made stronger U.S.-India ties much harder to achieve. It offered India civil nuclear 
cooperation. Dealing more directly with India on its nuclear program could, many judged, restrain 
Indian nuclear activities, yield benefits in controlling sensitive Indian exports, and help prevent 
nuclear war on the subcontinent.  
At the same time, the United States was driven by a desire to work with India on a broader, 
strategic level and judged that the nuclear issue was a thorn best removed, though not at any 
cost. “A better U.S.-Indian relationship could help the United States more effectively combat 
terrorism; like America, India has suffered from terrorist attacks, and working more closely 
together, each country might learn from the other’s experiences... Meanwhile as U.S. policy 
increasingly focused on promoting democracy worldwide, the appeal of a deeper relationship with 
the world’s largest democracy was undeniable,” writes Michael A. Levi and Charles D. 
Ferguson.[2]  
What the Carnegie Report Says:  
The United States must align with India because: 
• By 2015, it will have the fourth most capable concentration of power.  
• It will be among the five major economies in twenty-five to fifty years.  
• It can be a counterfoil to China.  
• It can stabilize the region littered with failing states.  
The rise of India on the global stage is no longer a question but an answer. The United States 
must thus shed old inhibitions, adopt new attitudes and forge ahead with India because it is in 
America’s interest.  
Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, looks at India with 
open eyes and dares to call for radical changes—on the American side. India as a New Global 
Power: An Action Agenda for the United States breaks the mold of the predictable, the 
comfortable, the merely tinkering-with-policy attitude that managed to obscure President George 
Bush’s ideas for India in the first term.  
During Bush’s first term, Robert Blackwill, the former U.S. Ambassador to India, forced many 
positive changes in U.S. policy despite stiff resistance, with Tellis as his advisor in New Delhi.[3] 
Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in the Opening Statement 
for Hearing on U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement on April 5, 2006, said: “The India nuclear 
deal is one of the most ambitious foreign policy initiatives to come before Congress in many 
years... I believe that we will find little argument in Congress with the general premise that the 
national security and economic future of the United States would be enhanced by a strong and 
enduring partnership with India.”  
Our nations share common democratic values and the potential of our economic engagement is 
limitless. The progress made by India in the last decade is one of the world’s major success 
stories.  
With a well-educated middle class that is larger than the entire U.S. population, India can be an 
anchor of stability in Asia and an engine of global economic growth. Despite this success, the 
Indian government recognizes that much of its growing population still lives in poverty. To 
overcome these conditions, it will need more trade, more scientific and technical cooperation, and 
most of all, more energy.  
India’s energy needs are expected to double by 2025. The United States has an interest in 
expanding energy cooperation with India to develop new technologies, cushion supply disruptions, 
cut greenhouse gas emissions, and prepare for declining global fossil fuel reserves. “The United 
States’ own energy problems will be exacerbated if we do not forge energy partnerships with 
India, China, and other nations experiencing rapid economic growth,” noted Lugar.[4]  
The political significance for the United States of this crucial deal lay in the combination of the 
following factors:  
• The NPT, NSG and other associated restrictive regimes on nuclear affairs, primarily 
aimed at India, failed to arrest the emergence of India as a nuclear weapons power.  
• India also had created an extensive nuclear infrastructure with a formidable potential.  
• The NPT had become a redundant feature of the international system and out of sync 
with existing global strategic realities.  
Both the Clinton and the Bush Administrations had come to a similar conclusion, that in the 
absence of a roll-back of India’s nuclear program, the next best political option was to bring 
India’s future nuclear activities within IAEA monitoring. Both believed that this would ensure that 
in the future, India’s nuclear expertise did not flow to any “rogue states” and endanger U.S. 
national security interests.  
The Bush Administration after examination of global strategic realities and India’s burgeoning 
economic and industrial potential and her power attributes dictated an imperative that United 
States long term national security and strategic interests in the twenty-first century would best be 
served by a reinforced strategic partnership with India. “Politically, the major aim of this deal for 
the United States was to ensure that with a massive boost in civil nuclear power generation, India 
was to be no longer dependant on hydro-carbons on politically unstable regions or on countries 
with which the United States has concerns about,” wrote Dr. Subhash Kapila in his article “United 
States-India Civil Nuclear Deal Reviewed” for the South Asia Analysis Group.[5]  
Within hours of Bush arriving from the subcontinent in March 2006, Under Secretary Burns made 
an effective sales pitch for the deal at the influential conservative think tank, the Heritage 
Foundation. Burns said the Bush administration was “very proud” of the pact, that by committing 
to declare 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors as civilian, India has been brought into the “non-
proliferation mainstream” without according it the status of a nuclear weapons state.[6]  
Congressmen Hyde and Lantos crafted their bill (as called the Hyde Act) to keep it safe from 
“killer amendments” they had anticipated from some committee members. In the end, just three 
amendments were adopted. Prior to the vote, Lantos noted, “The legislation will not please 
everyone in its entirety... Indeed, a non-binding clause says the United States must ‘secure 
India’s full and active participation’ in its efforts to ‘dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction 
and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction.’” 
The “statement of policy” section of the bill, though non-binding, also notes the United States will 
work to achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes 
by India; and secure India’s full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.  
Nuclear transfers can be terminated if India makes any “materially significant transfer of nuclear 
or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology that does not conform to NSG guidelines.”[7] 
Further, “Once the deal is in place, India’s commercial nuclear interactions with the United States, 
as well as with any other country, will be firmly controlled from Washington via the stipulations of 
the Hyde Act, enforced through the stranglehold the United States retains on the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group,” as some Indian scientist appealed to the government against the Deal on July 
18, 2008 in Mumbai, as reported by PTI and which appeared on Outlookindia.com.  
Any argument to the effect that the Deal will be governed only by the bilateral 123 Agreement is 
untenable, because this Agreement in turn is anchored in U.S. domestic laws, which include the 
Hyde Act. The Hyde Act prohibits the U.S. administration from directly or indirectly (through the 
IAEA or other countries) assisting India with life-time fuel supplies after suspension of the Deal. If 
India buys nuclear power plants from the United States, these would be under full-scale 
inspection of the IAEA, thus India cannot divert anything from these plants for defense purposes. 
India will not get the reprocessing plant, without which it cannot manufacture nuclear weapons. If 
the above concerns prove to be true, it will satisfy more the U.S. ambitions regarding the Deal.  
Current analysis says India is likely to be among the five major economies in the first half of this 
century and will overtake Japan, Germany, Britain and France at some point in the next 25 to 50 
years. “The record thus far amply substantiates the claim that India will be one of Asia’s two 
major ascending powers. It is expected that the Indian economy could grow at a rate of seven to 
eight percent for the next two decades. If these expectations are borne out, there is little doubt 
that India will overtake current giants,” as Tellis testified in the House of Representatives.  
 
In the Carnegie report, Tellis quotes an internal CIA assessment where countries are ranked for 
national power—weighted combinations of GDP, defense spending, population and technology 
growth. By 2015, India will have the fourth most “capable concentration of power,” after the 
United States, EU and China. The CIA analysis also calls India the most important “swing state” 
in the international system—a country that could tilt the balance between war and peace, 
between chaos and order. The National Intelligence Council, CIA’s brain trust, compared the 
emergence of India and China to the rise of Germany in the nineteenth century and the United 
States in the twentieth century in Mapping the Global Future, a public report.[8]  
The opening up of the Indian civilian nuclear sector offers huge opportunities for the Americans. 
Ron Somers, president of the U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC), believes that “India’s nuclear 
market will require an FDI of $100 billion, which will now be open for U.S. firms, and can create a 
potential 2,70,000 American jobs over the next decade.” The United States can easily grab a 40 
percent share of this pie. “The U.S. firms don’t want to lose time and they have obvious intentions 
to understand our nuclear power program,” observed S.K. Jain, CMD, Nuclear Power Corporation 
(NPC), while commenting on the American delegation that visited India two weeks before the 
Senate-Congress conference in Washington to approve the bilateral deal. The U.S. Under 
Secretary of International Trade, Franklin L. Lavin, agrees: “I have advised American firms to 
listen to and understand the operating style, technical requirements and safety needs of Indian 
utilities.” In February 2006, the United States announced its intent to “work with other nations... to 
develop new proliferation-resistant recycling technologies.” Admits Joe O. Neuhoff, director, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, “The U.S. is witnessing a new nuclear renaissance.”  
If the bilateral treaty is cleared by the IAEA, NSG and finally by the U.S. Congress, the Americans 
will be in a position to reap the benefits. For one, they can sell new reactors. Explains Vijay 
Sazawal, director, USEC, “India wants to produce 10,000 MW from foreign reactors by 2030. At 
$1.5-2 billion per reactor it’s $20 billion worth of business.” Adds William Cummins, VP, 
Westinghouse Electric: “Unlike the current Indian reactors, ours don’t reprocess fuel, which is 
banned by U.S. laws and frowned upon by the IAEA as reprocessing can lead to proliferation. 
The former are uneconomical too.”  
Others like USEC, a U.S. supplier of enriched uranium, will focus on selling “fuel that India will 
have to import” for the new light-water reactors. “Today, India negotiates turnkey projects to buy 
the fuel and the reactor together. We’ll encourage it to buy them separately, as most western 
nations do to get better deals. We’ll work on the Indian mindset to wean them away from package 
deals,” says Sazawal.[9]  
If India sets up ten large size nuclear power plants, which is its intent in the next fifteen years, 
India will import technology and hardware from the United States for at least half of these projects 
(technology for the remaining may come from elsewhere). Each of these plants at a green field 
site will cost about $4 billion. In short, orders worth $15-20 billion could be placed with U.S. 
companies in the next six to eight years. The remaining orders may go to France, Germany, 
Canada and UK. “Funds for these installations will come to India either in form of FDI or soft and 
commercial loans. Banks and equipment manufacturers abroad will be delighted to make this 
amount available to India. In return India will pay it back with goods and services export, in the 
same way China did it for the past 25 years. It is a win-win situation for the U.S. lenders and U.S. 
suppliers. Further expansion of business dealings on both sides will follow.”  
Another example of emerging Indo-U.S. cooperation is in the area of aerospace; orders for $8 
billion worth of commercial airplanes have been placed with Boeing, formerly of Seattle and 
currently headquartered in Chicago. Another big order for 125 military planes is on the way. High-
tech manufacturing industry is at a take-off stage in India. In the first quarter of 2006, 
announcements by big U.S. companies totaling $7 billion dollars in investment were made. That 
went far beyond India’s expectations. This sector together, with IT services and Business Process 
Outsourcing (BPO) will power U.S. businesses to higher profitability, and help India accelerate its 
growth. “Co-operation in auto parts, pharmaceuticals, R&D and defense industry cannot be ruled 
out. For each of these, the U.S. is looking for a low cost supplier, that could be alternative to 
China,” as Hari Sud wrote in his article, “India-U.S. Nuclear Deal—The Benefits” for South Asia 
Analysis Group .[10]  
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice readily admits America’s commercial interest in India. 
On April 5, 2006 she testified to the Committee on Foreign Relations in the United States Senate 
that the agreement with India was “crafted with the private sector firmly in mind.” She cited a $13 
billion deal by Boeing; she cited the hope of reactor sales by the U.S. nuclear industry; and she 
cited the opportunity for “U.S. companies to enter the lucrative and growing Indian market.”  
And India’s defense market seems to be the one that is really motivating the deal. India is 
shopping for billions of dollars worth of military aircraft, and the administration is hoping it will buy 
both the F-16 and the F-18. According to the American press, “officials in the defense industry 
and the Pentagon are saying that the main effect of the nuclear deal will be to remove India from 
the ranks of violators of international norms. And once this change in India’s status occurs, there 
will be no impediment to arms exports.” The Russian press is even more explicit. It complains that 
in addition to “recognition of India’s nuclear status by the United States,” the nuclear deal “opened 
the door to the Indian market for American arms merchants,” with the result that Russia may be 
squeezed out, as Gary Milhollin put before the Committee on Foreign Relations in the United 
States Senate.[11]  
Further, Tellis proposes “a comprehensive defense partnership” which can integrate the military-
to-military relations, defense trade and production, joint research and operations into a single 
document that defines an “ambitious vision.” Given the strain on the U.S. military, India and the 
United States can sign an MOU on operations in the Indian Ocean given the high-value traffic and 
India’s geographic advantages.  
Meanwhile, U.S. companies should be encouraged to invest in India’s defense sector, something 
that can help the trade imbalance.[12] Also, the United States can benefit immensely with India 
as a major military power. Forty percent of world’s oil and commerce passes through Indian 
Ocean sea-lanes. These today are unprotected. Pirates in the Red Sea and at the Malacca 
Straits prey on commerce. Indian cooperation will be helpful in keeping the sea-lanes free.  
Future military expansion in India as it takes up its role as a regional player bodes well for U.S. 
military hardware suppliers. They will gain immensely over the next twenty years.[13] Further, the 
United States needs to preserve order in South Asia. Look at the map and it becomes clear that 
India is “an island of democratic values and political stability in a region convulsed by religious 
fanaticism, illiberal governments, state sponsors of terrorism and economic stasis.” Every state 
on India’s periphery has “a need to cope with state failure.” 
If India joined its neighbors “in succumbing to state failure or was threatened by its neighbors’ 
pathologies,” it would be “catastrophic” for U.S. interests. A troubled India could unleash the 
disaffected into the world on a scale that would make “contemporary challenges look small in 
comparison.” Given the importance of India, President Bush has rightly set his eyes on enhancing 
relations, as Seema Sirohi opines.[14] And the Bush administration has been farsighted on this 
issue. With China rising, and Europe and Japan declining, it sees India as a natural partner. This 
agreement would bring a rising power into the global tent, making it not an outsider but a 
stakeholder, and giving it an incentive to help create and shape international norms and rules. For 
example, “India is becoming more worried about a nuclear Iran for this reason, and not because it 
is being pressured to do so by the United States. When India was being treated like an outlaw, it 
had no interest in playing the sheriff,” opines Fareed Zakaria.[15] Furthermore, “India’s vote to 
find Iran in non-compliance with IAEA standards was an even more dramatic example of where it 
stands on the critical effort to prevent a theocratic Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons 
capability,” said R. Nicholas Burns.  
The United States is much worried about Iran’s nuclear program and wants to curb it taking 
India’s help. “India also has the world’s second largest Muslim population, and a stronger 
relationship could help U.S. efforts to develop better relations with the Islamic world,” writes 
Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson. “At the moment as long as the U.S. stays in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the world will perceive the U.S. as a big bully. A major regional power, with a 
different outlook than the European and the U.S. is needed to cool the tempers off. India has to 
step in to prevent further sliding of the Middle East into anarchy,” opines Hari Sud.  
Another unstated benefit to the United States appears to be its assessment that India could be a 
counter-weight to a “rising China” in the region. Though this is not the view of some Indian 
policymakers, who believe that a constructive engagement with China is more beneficial and not 
linked to any military or strategic relationship with the United States. “U.S. policymakers of both 
political parties had long been concerned about a rising China, and by strengthening relations 
with China’s next-door neighbor, the administration saw the potential for a strategic hedge,” 
observe Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson. India is “a potential hedge against a rising 
China,” notes Tellis in his report, weaving together the threads of worry running through 
Washington. U.S. leaders are concerned about the growth of the Chinese military, its monetary 
policy, its vicious attacks on Japan and its increasing power projection capabilities. Both 
Secretary of State Rice and former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have sharply articulated 
their doubts on these grounds. An unbridled China is not in the U.S. interest, and by bolstering 
India, the United States can arrest the “growth of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean rimlands 
and Chinese penetration of Myanmar,” says the Carnegie Report. “With a few strokes of pen, 
President Bush eliminated a major Cold War irritant from the scene. India is not politically and 
diplomatically aligned with the U.S. as Europe is, but India as a strategic partner in ensuring 
safety of sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean is very valuable,” writes Hari Sud. “A more robust U.S.-
Indian relationship, it rightly reasoned, would lessen the chances that China could dominate the 
future of Asia,” observe Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson. With the non-proliferation 
objective in mind regarding India, the United States wants a power balance in Asia. Chinese 
dominance of Asia is not in favor of the United States. India may best serve as a counter-weight 
to China. 
The United States sees India as a strategic partner in Asia, as it has Britain in Europe and Israel 
in the Middle East. The United States wants India’s cooperation to cope with the challenges in 
Asia in particular, and of the world in general. Bringing Russia’s old friend of the Cold War era 
nearer to the United States can also be a happy moment for U.S. policymakers. 
About the Author 
Dr. Dheeraj Kumar completed his PhD on “Indo-U.S. Relations: The Context of Globalization” 
from the Department of History, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, U.P., India. Presently, he is 
working as a Lecturer of History at Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya (JNV), Nahan, Distt. Sirmour, 
Himachal Pradesh, India. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
References 
1. R. Nicholas Burns, “The U.S. and India: The New Strategic Partnership,” Speech to the Asia 
Society, New York, October 18, 2005.  
2. Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson, “U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for 
Moving Forward,” Council On Foreign Relations, June 2006.  
3. Seema Sirohi, “U.S.-India Relations; India, Big Time,” Outlookindia.com, July 11, 2005.  
4. Richard G. Lugar, “The Agreement and its Implications,” Outlookindia.com, April 5, 2006.  
5. Dr. Subhash Kapila, “United States-India Civil Nuclear Deal Reviewed,” South Asia Analysis 
Group, Paper no. 1670, January 10, 2006.  
6. Ashish Kumar Sen, “The Deal Spiel,” Outlookindia.com, March 20, 2006.  
7. Ashish Kumar Sen, “U.S. Congress: Indo-U.S. Deal; 37-5, That’s a Goal,” Outlookindia.com, 
July 10, 2006.  
8. Sirohi, Op. Cit.  
9. Shuchi Srivastava, “Nuclear Deal; Waiting To Go Boom,” Outlookindia.com, December 18, 
2006. 
10. Hari Sud, “India-U.S. Nuclear Deal—The Benefits,” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 
1740, March 20, 2006.  
11. Gary Milhollin, Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, April 26, 2006.  
12. Sirohi, Op. Cit.  
13. Sud, Op. Cit.  
14. Sirohi, Op. Cit.  
15. Fareed Zakaria, “Negotiating Nukes With India,” Newsweek International Edition, February 27, 
2006. 
